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SECTION 16(b): A NEW TREND IN
REGULATING INSIDER TRADING
Lewis D. Loveife3s
One of the more widely publicized and litigated provisions of
the federal securities laws is section 16(b)i of the Stcuritie§ Exchanige
Act of 1984.b Enacted for the expres§ puirpose of preVenting the unfair
use of confidential corportte information by ifiides, sectioft 16(b) provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by iich beheficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any
profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale
and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an
exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless such security Was acquired in good faith in cbnnection with a
debt previously cofitracted, shill inure to and be recoverable by
the issuer, irrespecdve of any intdndoii on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction
of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such
profit may be ifntituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, br by the owner of any security
of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer
shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request
or shall fail diligently to pi secute the saie thereafter; but no
such suit shall be brought more thani two years after the dAte Such
profit was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover
any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at
the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the
security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the
Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended Within the purpose of this subsection.3
This article elucidates and analyzes a striking dev&I6pment of
recent judicial interpretations and applications of this section. The
federal judiciary within the last few years has shifted from a strict and
comparatively harsh objective interpietation of the section to a much
t Member of the New York Bar. A.B., 1957, LL.B., 196i, H rvard University. The
author wishes to thank Fern Lowenfels, Seymbui B. Goldfeld, Esq., afid Roger Alan
Tolins, Esq., for their helpful suggestion§ ifi 6innecti6n with the pfipiiation of this artide.
1 i5 US.C. § 78p(b) (194).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 781.78jj (1964).
3 48 Stat. 896 (1954), 15 US,
§ 78p(b) (1964).
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more subjective approach, an analysis less concerned with the narrow
letter of the law than with the particular facts at bar-in short, an
approach less automatic and mechanistic and more fact-oriented and
pragmatic.4 Whether or not this new ,subjective approach has any support in the statute and its legislative history and the policy considerations both for and against this new subjective approach are examined.
Finally, the new trend is analyzed in the larger context and perspective
of the growth of implied liabilities under other provisions of the federal
securities laws and of recent .developments under state law.
I
THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH

For over thirty years the great majority of decisions on both the
federal district court and appellate levels followed the "crude ruleof-thumb-objective approach" in interpreting and applying section
16(b).5 The crucial issue in each of these cases was whether or not
the defendant had purchased and sold the securities in question for
a profit within a six month period. If such actions had been consummated, then the defendant was held liable. A particularly harsh method
of computing the magnitude of liability-by matching defendant's
highest sales against his lowest purchases-added to the severity of section 16(b)'s impact. 6 -Very little subjective reasoning was attempted in
4 See Painter, The Evolving Role of Section 16(b), 62 MICH. L. REv. 649 (1964).
5 The two leading cases illustrating this approach are discussed in detail below. They
are Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947);
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 US. 751 (1943).
6 For a full discussion with respect to the computation of liability under § 16(b), see
Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act (parts 1 & 2), 66
H v. L. Rxv: 385, 612 (1953). The application of the "highest sales matched against the
lowest purchases" method of computation can best be appreciated by a hypothetical illustration. Assume that an insider enters into the following transactions, which are grouped
together for simplicity of analysis:
(1) 4/ 1/63 Buys 100 shares at 120
,(2) 5/15/63 Buys 100 shares at 90
(3) 5/18/63 Sells 100 shares at 93
(4) 5/21/63 Buys 100 shares at 96
(5) 5/23/63 Sells 100 shares at 98
(6) 5/26/63 Buys 100 shares at 110
(7) 5/29/63 Sells 100 shares at 113
(8) 8/10/63 Sells 100 shares at 120
A businessman examining this sequence of transactions would probably conclude that the
insider made a profit of $300 on transactions (2) and (3), $200 on (4) and (5), $300 on (6)
and (7), and $0 on (1) and (8), closing the account, for a total trading profit of $800. However, by matching lowest price in with highestprice out, the following tabulation is made:
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any of these cases. For example, it made little difference whether or
not the defendant in question had actually used inside information to
his own advantage. Moreover, it was seldom asked whether or not the
transaction in question could possibly lend itself to the type of speculative activity that the statute was designed to prevent. The fact that
defendant's purchase or sale was entirely involuntary, or that the purchases and sales were between entities controlled by the same interests
without the slightest opportunity for speculative profit, made little difference.
Two early decisions by the Second Circuit, Smolowe v. Delendo
Corp.7 and Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte,s stood as twin authorities
for implementing this objective approach. In Smolowe, minority stockholders of the Delendo Corporation sued two directors and officers of
that corporation for profits realized from purchases and sales of Delendo common stock within a six month period. Plaintiffs conceded
that defendants had acted in good faith and without any unfair use of
inside information, but nonetheless contended, that section 16(b) required them to disgorge any profits realized from their trading activities. The district court sustained plaintiffs' position 9 and the Second
Circuit affirmed.' 0 In an opinion which was to have far-reaching implications, Judge Clark stated:
It is apparent . .. from the language of'§ 16(b) itself, as well as
from the Congressional hearings, that the only remedy which its
framers deemed effective for this reform was the imposition of a
liability based upon an objective measure of proof....
A subjective standard of proof, requiring a, showing of an actual unfair use of inside information, would render senseless the
provisions of the legislation limiting the liability' period to six
months, making an intention to profit during that period'imma: terial, and exempting transactions wherein there is a bona fide
acquisition of stock in connection with a previously contracted
debt. .

.

. its total effect would be to. render the statute little

more of an incentive to insiders to refrain from profiteering at
the expense of the outside stockholder than are the common-law
Purchases
100 at 90 (trans. (2))

Sales
100 at 120 (trans. (8)).

100 at 96 (trans. (4))

100 at 113 (trans. (7))
100 at 98 (trans. (5))

100 at 110 (trans. (6))

Profit
3,000

1,700
,

0
Thus appears a total § 16(b) profit of $4,700. In this computation all transactions which
yield losses are to be ignored.
7 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
8 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 US. 761 (1947).
9 46 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
10 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943).
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rules of liability; it would impose a more stringent statute of limitation upon the party aggrieved at the same time that it allowed
the wrongdoer to share in the spoils of recovery.'1
The decisiofi in Srholbwe Was justified by that particuilar factual
setting. Deftndaits did have inside information with respect td ah advatitageotis tax settleeiitt and d possible merget and, although no abuse
of ifiside iihformatibh was alleged, it was cleat that defendants' activity
tould have lent itself to the types of abuses that the statute was designed to prevent. The unfortunate aspect of the Smolowe opinion is
that it was the first major interpretive decision under section 16(b),
and its sweeping lahgug wag to have harsh effects whdn applied indiscrimiflately to completely different sets bf facts in the future. Moreover, it was the Sraolowe c6urt Which introduced the "highest sales
matched agahist the lowest purchases" mheagute of damagesj1 2 a standard that was to pr6ve too .ev.ete even for some later courts weaned
in the traditidn of a harsh, objective apptoach. 13
Mr Park & Tilfo~di Ine. V. SchUtlte i defendahts, cofitt6lling shareholders of Pirk & Tilfofd, Inc, were trustees of a trust 6wfiiig P2rk &
Tilfdrd pfefered stock. This preferied stotk Was redeemable at fiftyfive dollafg per shate and conve-tible into Park & Tilfotd commihon
stock in the ratio of 11/4 shares of comm6xi for each share of preferred.
After a spectacular rise in the price of the common, probably because
of a rumor of an impending dividend to be paid in liquor, the corporation seived n6tice of rederfmpti6ri of its preferfed stock. Within a
month defendants dovtted theif preferred, valied at 364,871 dollars,
into conmon, valued at 480,853 dbliars, ad Withiin six months thereafter sold the common for 782,9§9 doiars, Plaifiti thereupon sued
under section 16(b) to recover the profits realized by defendants. The
district court held for plaintiff, awarding 302,145 dollats in damages,
and the defendants immediately appealed.15
The dtiurt of Appeals fot the Second drcuit digposed of the first
issue-whether or rot the conversion was a purchase of the common
stock-in short order.
Defendants did not own the common stock in question before
they exercised their option to convert; they did afterward. Therefore they acquired the stock, within the meaning of the Act ....
Not otherwise could the Act accomplish the Congressional pur11
12
13
14

Id. at 235-36 (footnote omitted).
See note 6 supra.
See pp. 52-53 infra.
160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947).

15 See iM,at 987.
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pose to protect the outside stockholders against at least shortswing
speculation by insiders with advance informtion.10
The court then faced the issue of damages-specifically whether or not
the purchase price upon conversion was the 364,871 dollar value of the
preferred or the higher 480,853 dollar value of the common. Choosing
to follow the path which would "squeeze all possible profits out of stock
transactions, and... establish a standard so high as to prevent any conflict between the selfish interest of a fiduciary ...and the faithful perfprmance of his duty,"1 7 the court opted for the lower figure and thus
increased the damages awarded to 418,128 dollars.
As in Smolowe, the decision in Park & Tilford was justified by the
facts at bar. The problem, however, was the sweeping nature of the
holding. Defendants had argued that their conversion was forced by
the corporation's call for redemption and thus was an involuntary act
falling outside the ambit of section 16(b). The court of appeals labeled
this contention "somewhat absurd,""' as indeed it was, in light of the
fact that defendants controlled the corporation and thus could have
prevented the passage of the redemption resolution or rescinded it
after passage. Unfortunately, later decisions were not so discriminating. Situations where defendants were genuinely forced into involuntary conversions were not always held to fall outside the sweep of the
holding in Park &.Tilford.19
It is beyond the purpose and scope of this article to trace the
growth and development of the objective interpretation of section
16(b). The progeny of Smolowe and Park & Tilford have been fully
analyzed by other commentators. 20 It suffices to say that the great ma16 Id.
17 Id. at 988, quoting Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 281, 289 (2d Cir. 1948).
18 Id.
19 See, e.g., Fetteys v. Northwest Airlines, 246 F. Supp. 526 (D. Minn. 1965), which

fortunately was reversed on appeal sub nom. Petteys v. Butler, 867 F.2d 528 (8th Cir.
1966). See p. 54 infra. See also Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. 881 (D.N.J.
1963), aff'd in part on other grounds, 852 F.2d 156 (Sd Cir. 1965). Here defendant was
"requested' to convert his debentures because the conversion would materially improve

the appearance of the company's financial statement. Many situations of genuine involuntary conversions engendering problems for insiders remain unreported because they
never reach the stage of litigation. The "offending" insider is merely informed of his

transgression, usually after a letter is received by the corporation from one of the
lawyers specializing in § 16(b) cases, and restitutioi is promptly made by the insider to

the corporation.
20 The principal law review articles dealing with § 16(b) are: Cole, Insiders' Liabilities
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 12 Sw. L.J. 147 (1958); Cook & Feldman,
Insider trading Under the Securities Exchange Act (parts I & 2), 66 HAuv. L. REVv. 885,
612 (1953); Hamilton, Convertible Securities and Section 16(b): The End of An Era, 44
TEXAS L. Ray. 1447 (1966); Laufer, Effect of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
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jority of 16(b) decisions between 1934 and 1964 regarded the harsh, "no
excuses taken" approach as absolutely vital to protect the investing
public against insider abuses. Occasional aberrations appeared in the
form of isolated opinions adopting a more subjective approach. For
example, Judge (now Mr. Justice) Potter Stewart refused to apply the
holding in Park & Tilford to a situation involving a genuinely involuntary conversion without any possibility of speculative, insider abuse. 21
And the Second Circuit refused the application of a "black-letter rubric" to a reclassification situation that affected all shareholders equally
and granted no speculative advantages to the defendants. 22 Such
opinions, however, were rare, and until very recently, the great weight
of authority adhered to the principles of Smolowe and Park & Tilford.
II

THE NEW

TREND

A. The Appellate Level
The last four years have witnessed an abrupt shift in the trend of
judicial interpretation under section 16(b). The approach elucidated in
the preceding section has been tempered by a more subjective approach,
an analysis more concerned with whether or not defendant's conduct
in a specific factual setting could possibly lend itself to the types of
abuses that the statute was designed to prevent. The first case to illustrate this approach on the appellate level was Blau v. Max Factor &
Company.23
Max Factor &cCompany had two classes of stock-class A stock,
which was publicly held, and common stock, which was held by certain insiders. These two classes of stock were identical in all respects
on Use of Options by Insiders, 8 N.Y.L.F. 232 (1962); Meeker & Cooney, The Problem
of Definition in Determining Insider Liabilities Under Section 16(b), 45 VA. L. REV. 949
(1959); Painter, The Evolving Role of,Section 16(b), 62 MIcH. L., REv. 649 (1964); Rubin
& Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use of Corporate Information by Insiders,
95 U. PA. L. REv. 468 (1947); Comment, Securities Regulation: Insider Status in Legal
Fiction and Financial Fact-,A Proposed Revision to Section 16(b), 50 CALF. L. REV.
500 (1962); Comment, Convertible Securities and Section 16(b): The Persistent Problems
of Purchase, Sale and Debts Previously Contracted, 64 MicH. L. REV. 474 (1966); Comment,
The Scope of "Purchase and Sale" Under Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, 59 YALE
L.J. 510 (1950). See also Conant, Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who Purchase
Shares, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 53 (1960); Painter, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act:
Legislative Compromise or Loophole, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 358 (1965).
21 Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
22 Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954).
23 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.),. cert. denied, 382 US. 892 (1965)., - I
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except that the board of directors was empowered to declare lesser dividends on the common than on the class A stock. The two classes had
been created to permit the payment of maximum dividends to the public stockholders while retaining earnings otherwise payable to the insiders for use in the business without exposing the insiders to potential
tax liability. Under the corporation's charter, common stock was exchangeable for class A stock, share for share, at any time. In contemplation of selling a portion of their holdings to the public, the insiders
exchanged 200,000 shares of common stock for an equal number of
class A shares and within one month sold the latter shares to the public. Plaintiff sued to recover "profits" which allegedly resulted from-an
increase in the market price of the class A between the date of the exchange and the date of sale. The Ninth Circuit refused to see the exchange of common for class A as a purchase of class A within the meaning of section 16(b),and dismissed plaintiff's complaint. 24 The court's
opinion distinguished the decision in Park & Tilford.2 5 The rationale
behind the holding in Max Factorwas stated as follows:
Appellees' investment commitment in Max Factor & Co. was
a long-term one, undertaken, as we have noted, many years prior
to their exchange of Common for Class A. The exchange of Class
A for Common did not interrupt the continuity of appellees' investment: it did not increase or decrease the amount invested,
or alter in any way the risk assumed long years before. Moreover,
since there was no speculative advantage in holding Class A rather
than Common, the exchange conferred no opportunity for speculative profit which appellees did not already enjoy....
Thus, the making of the exchange, and its timing, were simply
irrelevant to the use of insider information in short-term speculation-the problemwith which section 16(b) is concerned.2
24 Id.
25 Id.

at 309.

26 Id. at 308-09. The adoption of rule 16b-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-9, by the SEC on

February 17, 1965 appears to alter substantially the -rules in the conversion area. It
remains to be seen what kind of a reception the courts will afford rule 16b-9, which reads
as follows:
(a) Any acquisition or disposition of an equity security involved in the conversion of an equity security which, by its terms or pursuant to the terms of the
corporate charter or other governing instruments, is convertible immediately or
after a stated period of time into another equity security of the same issuer,
shall be exempt from the operation of -section 16(b) of the Act: Provided,
however, That this section shall not apply to the extent that there shall have
been either (1)a purchase of any equity security of the class convertible (including
any acquisition of or change in a conversion privilege) and a sale of any equity
security of the class issuable upon conversion, or (2) a sale of any equity security
of the class convertible and any purchase of any equity security issuable upon
conversion (otherwise than in a transaction involved in such conversion or in a
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The next decision illustrating the new trend was Heli-Coil
Corp v. Webster.2 7 Defendant, a director of Heli-Coil Corp., pdirchased convertible debentures in that corporation on November 20,
1958, converted the debentures into inderlying common .tock on
March 18, 1959j and within six months sold the underlying common.
Plaintiff claimed that the conVersion of the debentuies into the underlying common stock was a sale of the debentures and a ptirchftse of the
common within the meaning of section 16(b)) and therefore defendant
should be liable for the 71,400 dollar increase in the value of the debentures between November 20, 1958 and March 18, 1959 and for the
45,144 dollar increase it the Value Of the common between Match 18,
1959 and the date of its sale. The district court sustained plaintiff's
position, 28 but the Third Gircuit reversed in part. Adhering to the
position enunciated by the Securities and Exchange Commission in its
amicus brief, the court of appeals held that the cofiversion of the debentures was indeed a sale of the debentures and a purchase of the
underlying common stock but that no profit had been realized by the
defendant at the time of this conversion. A profit was realized by defendant only when the underlying common stock was sold for cash.
This, plaintiff's recovery was limited to the 45,i44 dollar increase in
the value of the common stock between March 18, 1959 and the date
of its sale. The court spoke in terms of an "objective test" and a "crude
rule-of-thumb" and purported to follow the authority of Park & Tilford.29 But the decision itself, a§ the disgeriters pointed out, was really
an illogical cosfipiOmise betweei the distiict co~irt's bpinioh, which
carried the "crude rule-of-thumb" approach to its logical conclusion
and awarded plaintiff the full 1i6,544 dollars, and the holding in Blau
v. Max Factor& Co., which would absolve the plaintiff from all liability
on the theory that the conversion of the debentures was neither a sale
of the debentures nor a purchase of the underlying common st~ck.
Nine months after the holding in Heli-Coil, the Seohd Circuit
transaction axnpted by any bifier risl iiridei sectiosi 16(b)) Within a pdriod of
leis than 6 nionths which includes the date of conveision.
(b) For the purpose of this section, an equity security shall not be deemed
to be acquired or disposed of upon conversion of an equity security if the terms
of the equity security converted require the payment or entail the receipt, in
connection with such conversion, of cash or other property (other than equity
securities involved in the conversion) equal in value at the time of conversion to
more than 15 percent of the value of the equity security issued upon conversion.
(c) For the purpose of this section, an equity security shall be deemed convertible if it is convertible at the option of the holder or of some other person or
by operation of the terms of the security or the governing instruments.
27

352 F.2d i56 (3d Cir. 1965).

222 . Stipp. 831 (D.N.J. 1903).
29 352 F.2d at 165-67%
28
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moved to follow the trend initiated by Max Factor.In Blau v. Lamb, 0
Edward Lamb, an officer and director of Air-Way Industries, and Edward Lamb Enterprises, a family corporation wholly owned by the
Lambs, had received convertible preferred stock of Air-Way pursuant
to a merger between Air-Way and Lamb Industries, a private corpora.tigpn ninety-seven per cent owned by Lamb and his family. Within six
months after receiving the Air-Way convertible preferred stock, Edward
Lamb and Edward Lamb Enterprises converted these securities into AirWay common stock as part of a preconceived plan to increase Lamb's
voting control of Air-Way. Plaintiff claimed that these conversions were
sales of the preferred stock which must be matched against the earlier
p-urchawss of the preferred under section 16(b), and, therefore, Air-Way
was entitled to a 1,108,732 dollar recovery from Edward Lamb. The
district court held for plaintiff stating, "It requires little imagination
to infer . . . a corporate milieu rife with opportunities for speculation
and misuse of inside information."33l The Second Circuit reversed,
emphasizing the judicial obligation to apply reason to each individual
fact situation. Even assuming that the conversion had been prompted by
Lamb's desire to increase his control of Air-Way, the court of appeals
emphasized that the economic equivalence of the convertible preferred
stock and the common stock, combined with the unchanged invest,
ment position of Edward Lamb and Edward Lamb Enterprises, insured that the "conversion afforded the insiders no opportunity to
realize a gain by speculative trading inAir-Way Preferred."' 2 For this
reason, the court held that the conversion was not a section 16(b) sale
of the preferred.
The court of appeals in Blau v. Lamb was obliged by the facts of
that case to carry its subjective reasoning beyond the conversion area.
Plaintiff had claimed that certain transfers of Air-Way common stock
between Edward Lamb Entqrpriseq ana Lamb Industries within a six
month period engendered profits recoverable under section 16(b). The
court of appeals concluded:
By virtue of Lamb's pervasiye control over Industries and Enterprises, there was at most a token change in the insider's investment position when Mir-Way Common was transferred from Industries to Enterprises; Lamb indirectly owned this stock both
before and after its transfer. Thus Lamb did not place himself
where he could make any more advantageous use of inside information for speculative purposes that he could have before the
30 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U. . IQ02 (19§?).
31 242 F. Supp. 151, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
32 363 F.2d at 522.
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transfer. Nor did the decision to transfer the Air-Way Common
alter the nature of his investment, increase or decrease the amount
invested, or alter in any, way the risks involved. 33
Further, the court of appeals rejected, the district court's argument that
all transfers between corporate pocketbooks less than one hundred per
cent owned should be subjected to ection 16(b) liability, because no
precise criteria exist to enable courts to know how much control less
than one hundred per cent is enough to invoke the statute.
.A scant three months after the decision in Blau v. Lamb, the
Eigh C u adopted the subjective approach in Petteys v. Butler.84
In Petteys, two directors and minority stockholders of Northwest Airlines converted their holdings of preferred stock into common stock
pursuant to a call for redemption of the preferred, and within six
months sold the common at substantially -increased prices. Plaintiff
claimed that the conversion was a purchase of the common which section 16(b) required to be matched against the later sales of the common and that defendants were liable for the- profits realized. The
district court sustained plaintiff's position, 35 but the court of appeals
reversed. Emphasizing that "each case must be examined on its own
facts and the Act only applied when these facts disclose the possibility
of abuses that the Act [was] designed to prevent,"8' 6 , the court found
that the defendants' actions could not possibly have' resulted in insider
speculation:
The preferred stock held by the two directors was fully mar-

ketable and listed on the New York Exchange.' It was protected
against dilution, had equal voting power, was fully convertible
and at all times maintained a market value equivalent to the common. The conversion did not increase or decrease the amount invested, change the proportion of ownership, affect voting rights,
or substaniially alter the risk assumed. Blau v. Max Factor 'supra.
Thus, it appears to us that the common and preferred are truly
"economic equivalents"' in which speculation from their conversion would be virtually impossible 3 7
1
The most recent decision on the appellate level adopting the subjective approach carried the new trend beyond previous authorities.
In Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp.,38 Chemical Fund became the
owner of more than ten per cent of Xerox's 4 per cent convertible
Id. at 526.
34 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967), aff'g Petteys v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 526 (D. Minn. 1965).
35 246 F. Supp. 526 (1). Minn.. 1965).
36 367 F.2d at 533.
87 Id. at 537.
8 377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967).
33
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subordinated debentures in December of 1962 and, for the following
eleven months, continued to hold more than ten per cent of this class
of securities. During this eleven month period the Fund continuously
sold Xerox common and purchased convertible debentures in an effort
to increase the yield from its investment in Xerox. The case arose when
Chemical Fund sought a declaratory judgment absolving it from any
liability to Xerox under section 16(b) and Xerox counterclaimed seeking judgment for 158,972 dollars. The district court applied section
16(b) in the orthodox, mechanical fashion, matched the lowest pur*chases of debentures against the highest sales of the "equivalent" com3 9 The court of appeals unequivocally remon, and held for plaintiff
versed. In an opinion which not only overturned the court below, but,
also specifically disregarded the position taken in the amicus brief submitted by the Securities and Exchange Commission, the court of appeals held that the debentures were not a class of equity securities by
themselves and that the total percentage of Xerox common that a
debenture holder would own following a hypothetical conversion of
his debentures was the relevant percentage for testing whether the
defendant was a more than ten per cent holder under section 16(b).
Since the Fund would only own 2.7 per cent of Xerox common under
this test, it was absolved from liability. The court went to particular
lengths to justify its decision on the ground that bondholders do not
have the same access to inside information as officers, directors and ten
per cent stockholders.
The court's emphasis upon reason is refreshing in an area marked
chiefly by mechanical decisions. Moreover, the court's reluctance to
penalize public investors in a mutual fund for management's inadvertent and comparatively technical violations of the Securities Exchange Act is commendable. The decision, however, did not face the
problem that defendant's conduct could have lent itself to the types
of abuses that 16(b) was designed to prevent. The fund had one of its
own directors on the Xerox board of directors, thus granting it easy
entry to inside information which could have proven valuable in connection with its trading activities. Also, the court's statutory argument
was weak. Section 16(a) provides for recovery from a "beneficial owner
of more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security" 40 and
under section 3(a)(l1) it is clear that a debenture convertible into an
equity security is an equity security. 41 In the last analysis, however, the
court of appeals probably reached the preferable result on the fact patSO See id. at 108-09.
40 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964).
41

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(11) (1964).
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tern presented by this particular case, and, in the event an abuse of
inside information arises in a similar factual setting in the future, the
court will have ample weapons with which to fashion an appropriate
42
remedy.
B. The District Courts
Four of the five decisions summarized above repre§ent reyersals
by several federal appellate courts of district court decisions. It is clear
from these cases that courts of appeals arle leading the way toward a
more rational, subjective interpretation of section 16(b), There is recent
evidence, however, that the federal district courts are beginijing to sense
this new trend and to follow it,
In Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp,,- 3 plaintiff, a shareholder of
Sperry Rand Corporation, sought recovery, on behalf of Sperry Rand,
of profits realized by defendant Martin Marietta from alleged purchases and sales of Sperry common stock within a six month period.
The crucial issue was whether or not Martin was a director of Sperry
within the meaning of section 16(b), and this in turn depended upon
whether the chief executive officer of Martin, who was also a director
of Sperry, had been deputized by defendant to represent its interests
on the Sperry board. 44 The court rejected any litmus paper test in
reaching its decision, preferring to examine the peculiar factual circumstances of the situation before it with meticulous care, The court
found that it was Sperry's initiative that caused the Martin officer to
join its board, not any afrmative action on the part of defendant.
The court further found that the officer's personal i terest not the
desire to represent Martin's investment interests, was the primary motivation for his acceptance of the Sperry directorship. In addition, the
officer involved neither disclosed inside information relevant to Sperry
investment matters nor reported what transpired at Sperry's board meetngs to Martin. Finally, the court found that no instructions were given
by Mrtin as to what positions the officer was to take on Spevry matters. Thus, the district court held that Martin did not deputize the
officer to represent its interests on the Sperry board and dismissed plaintiff's complaint. The crucial element to be gleaned from this case is
not so mnich the holding, which depends upon how one chooses to read
the conflicting evidence, but rather the process of reasoning in reach4-3 1968 CQH FED~. SEc. L. REP.f 92,140 (4.D.N4'. 1968).
44 For other cases which have considered this problem, see Blau v. Lehman, 286
F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1960), af'd, 368 U.S. 403 (1962); Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564 (2d

Cir. 1952).
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ing the decision-thd avoidance of a mechanical stafndard and the willingness to focus upon the peduliar facts of this particular case in seeking the path to a reasoned conclusion.
Another example of the new trend on the district court level is
Lynman v. Livingston.45 In this case, defendant Livingston purchased
convertible debentures in 1962, converted these debentures into common stock in December 1964, ahd, on February 22, 1965, sold the
common stock received upon conversion, Plaintiff claimed that the
conversion of the debentures represented a purchase of the common
which had to be matched against the Ikter sales of the common under
section 16(b). The district court disagreed refused to View the conversion as a purchase of the common, and entered summary judgment for
defendant. The trux of the court's reasoning was based oil the fact that
the corporation had called its ddbenturds for redemption on January 6,
1965. Thus defendant's conversion was entirely involuntary as a practical matter. If he failed to convert, he Would have been compelled to
accept 1,057 dollars for each 1,000 dollar debenuire. If he sold hi8 debentures on the open market, he would have realized 1,938 dollars per
debenture, but would have been obliged to pay substantial taxes. Only
by conversion could the defendant realize the full 1,938 dollar market
value per debenture and at the same time avoid taxes. Thus "the con
version which Livingston effected was compelled as a matter of eco,
nomic necessity." 46 The court went on to distinguish Park & Tilford
and t6 conclude that the traiisaction in question "was not one that
could have lent itself to the practices which eitioh 16(b) was enacted
47
to prevent.1
III
THE CRITQUE

The new trend toward a more subjective approach in applying
section 16(b) finds substantial support in the statute, the legislative
history, and contemporary developments under both the federal §ecurities laws and state common law.
A.

The Statute

Three principal arguments based upon the words 6f section i6(b)
may be advanced to support the subjective apprbach. First, the initial
45 276 F. Supp. 104 (D. Del. 1967).
46 Id.
47 Id.

at 106.
at 107, quoting Ferraiolo v. Newmahi) 259 F.2d 542, 546 (6th Cir. 1958).
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clause of section 16(b) describes its purpose as ". . preventing the
unfair use of information which may have been obtained by such
beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to
the issuer . . ." This is not objective, mechanistic language. A policy and a purpose-to prevent the unfair use of inside information for
speculative profit by officers, directors, and more than ten per cent
shareholders-is clearly set out, and the remaining provisions of section 16(b) are designed to implement this policy and purpose. Where
the courts find that no possibility of this type of abuse exists, the statute
has no application. Second, section 16(b) authorizes the recovery of any
profits realized by an insider trading within a period of six months
"irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months." 48 A number of courts, adhering to the traditional,
objective approach, have read this language as though it required the
insider to be held liable for profits realized in a six month period
"irrespective of any possibility of unfair use of inside information." In
light of the statutory language used, such an interpretation seems unduly harsh. The courts
n
ht to ask whether or not the insider
initially intended to consummate a six month trade; this is expressly
orece bthe statute. On the other hand, the courts would seem
to have every right to ask whether or not the facts at bar could possiblmlend ttemselves to the types of abuses that 16(b) was intnded
topreneit- Indeed, this type of an inquiry would seem to be
mandated by the initial clause of section 16(b) quoted above. Finally,
the Securities and Exchange Commission is empowered to exempt by
regulation any transactions "not comprehended within the purpose of
this subsection." 49 It would seem that Congress realized that section
16(b) could become purposelessly harsh if applied too objectively and
thus added a safety valve in the form of an administrative exemptive
power. Such agency rule-making, however, is typically limited to
exempting broad categories of transactions, as the rules promulgated
under section 16(b) illustrater0 Thus, if the congressional purpose is
to be properly implemented, it remains for the federal courts to temper
the possible injustices of section 16(b) via a flexible and pragmatic case
by case analysis.
It is difficult to make aconvincing case for the objective approach
48
49

48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
Id.

50 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-1 to 16b-10 (1968).
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under the language of section 16(b). One could argue that the initial
clause is merely intended to be introductory, an aid to constitutionality, and thus should be accorded little weight in militating toward a
subjective approach. 51 Also, the phrase "irrespective of any intention on
the part of such beneficial. owner, director, or officer in entering into
such transaction" 52 may express a congressional preference for an objective approach, no matter what qualifying words follow this phrase.
Finally, it might be contended that Congress's grant of exemptive power
to the Securities and Exchange Commission was the sole safety valve
intended for a rigid, inflexible statute; thus, the federal courts have
neither mandate nor right to create exemptions on a case by case basis.
Each of these arguments, however, is an unnatural, overly-technical
view of the statute. Indeed, in light of the statutory language, it is hard
to see why the federal courts adhered to the objective approach for so
long a period.
B. The Legislative History
The legislative history lends further support to the conclusions
drawn from an analysis of the words of section 16(b). The prevention
of the unfair use of inside information to' secure short term trading
profits by corporate directors, officers and substantial shareholders is
constantly reiterated as the central purpose underlying this statutory
provision. The Report of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency states unequivocally:
The bill further aims to protect the interests of the public by
preventing directors, officers, and principal stockholders of a corporation, the stock of which is traded in on exchanges, from speculating in the stock on the basis of information not available to
others. Any change in the holdings of such insiders must be reported to the Commission, and profits realized from the purchase
and sale, or the sale and purchase of an equity security within a
period of less than 6 months are recoverable by the corporation.
Such a provision will render difficult or. impossible the kind of
transactions which were frequently described to the committee,
where directors and large stockholders participated in pools trading in the stock of their own companies, with the benefit of advance information regarding an increase or resumption of dividends in some cases, and the passing of dividends in others.53
In addition, extensive hearings were held before congressional com51 This argument was set forth with approval in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d
231, 236 (2d Cir. 1943).
52 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
53 S. REP,. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934).
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Court's view that 1Ob-5 protects the whole community
of corporate
interests---creditors as well as stockholders. 1 92
The Third, 1 9 3 Fifth, 194 and Seventh' 9" Circuits have adopted
their own "new fraud" approaches which are broader than
Schoenbaum.196 Some Third and Seventh Circuit cases can be read as
imposing liability on directors for mismanagement in corporate securities dealings with anyone. 1 97 And the Fifth Circuit would extend
the 10b-5 net at least to transactions with officers, directors, and
"others in league with them or the one controlling them."'19 8 The
192 See Superintendent of Ins. v. BankersLife & Gas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971). This is
particularly true when creditors are injured although stockholders receive full information.
193Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 869-70 (3d Cir. 1968).
194Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 826-27 (5th Cir. 1970) (sale of control); Herpich v.
Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 811 (5th Cir. 1970) (purchase of assets at excessive price); Rekant v:
Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 881-82 (5th Cir. 1970) (sale of securities for inadequate consideration).
195 Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., l'tc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1333-34 (7th Cir. 1969)
(derivative action proper when "directors in position of conflicting interest orloyalty" and know
of unfairness to corporation); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 269-70 (7th Cir.)
(concurring opinion of two of three judges; corporate acquisition of own stock for excessive
price), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967). Although the district court in Dasho found no misrepresentation or concealment (267 F. Supp. 508, 512 (N.D. I1. 1966)), the concurring court of
appeals judges found fraud in the defendants' failure "to disclose [their] adverse personal
interest." 380 F.2d at 266. One of'the most important considerations underlying the court's
holding was the inadequacy of the consideration paid for the stock. Read from this perspective,
Dasho is broader than Swanson. However, when Dasho was appealed to the Seventh Circuit a
second time, the court of appeals analyzed the case in terms of deception. See Dasho v.
Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 25-26 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972). Condon v.
Richardson, 411 F.2d 489,492 (7th Cir. 1969), can be viewed as either a "new fraud" case or as a
deception case in which one director was selling securities to the issuer. Significantly, the court
stated that lOb-5 violations may arise even though the board is fully informed. Id.
In view of these cases and Schoenbaum, Ross v. Longchamps, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 434, 439
(E.D. Mo. 197 1), involving the dismissal of a case based on a transaction between a parent and a
53%-owned subsidiary on the ground of no deception, was decided incorrectly.
196 Each of the cases cited in notes 193-95supra involved a benefit, although not necessarily
a monetary one, to the defendants. Judge Smith's dissenting opinion in Drachman v. Harvey,
453 F.2d 722, 735-(2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on rehearingen banc, 453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972), appears
to expand the Second Circuit's "new fraud" concept to include any purchases that benefit the
controlling stockholder.
197 The Third Circuit case involved a sale for inadequate consideration to directors and
other purchasers. The directors were held responsible for damages with respect to all shares.
Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 869 (3d Cir. 1968), on remand, 303 F. Supp. 1257, 1279, 1281
(D.N.J. 1969). Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 269-70 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 977 (1967), involved a sale by the corporation to a dissident stockholder group. The sale,
made for inadequate consideration in order to silence the dissenting group's objections, was
held to be a Rule 10b-5 violation.
One early district court decision in the Second Circuit seems to have gone this far as well. See
New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261, 264-65, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
199 Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 882 (5th Cir. 1970), quoted in Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d
467, 477 (5th Cir. 1973); cf. Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir. 1970) (purchase of
assets for excessive consideration; no deceit necessary if other party to transaction controls
board or conspires with board).
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Eighth Circuit also has adopted a far-reaching rule which condemns
any securities transaction in which self-dealing violative of fiduciary
obligations can be found, even if the insiders' benefits arise indirectly
out of a trade between the issuer and outsiders. 199
"New fraud" principles should, of course, apply to an alleged
violation emanating from actions of officers or a committee of the
board.
3.

Negligence

Negligence is a possible alternative to deception and "new
fraud." There is some authority for the proposition that negligent
mismanagement is actionable under the Rule. 20 0 But this reasoning is
somewhat inconsistent with cases holding that Rule 10b-5 does not
reach all breaches of fiduciary obligation.2"'
C. The Causation and Reliance Elements
Analyses of causation and reliance are often intermingled in
mismanagement decisions. 20 2 Even when discussed separately, their
individual roles are unclear. Although causation is a necessary element in all 10b-5 suits, 20 3 a less stringent standard suffices for injunc"99 Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 519, 527-28 (8th Cir. 1973) (tender offer
followed by merger claimed to result in increased voting control, improved dividends, and
higher salaries and benefits for defendants).
200 Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 240, 243 n.2 (D. Neb. 1972) (negligence
enough); Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 234, 239 (D. Neb. 1972); see Dasho v.
Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 25 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972) (nondisclosure
to corporation not actionable if majority ofdirectors fully-informed, disinterested, and "ifin the
good faith exercise of their businessjudgment" they acted in best interests of company); Knauff
v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 408 F.2d 958,965 (10th Cir.),cerL denied,396 U.S. 831 (1969) (test
whether reasonably prudent judgment exercised). Contra, Kaplan v. Newman, [1970-1971
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,134, at 91,111 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (conscious
wrongdoing ordinarily required); Mader v. Armel, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 93,027, at 90,798 (S.D. Ohio 1971) (negligence possible basis for injunction, but
not for damages under lOb-5); Carliner v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 25, 29 (D. Md. 1965)
(director's action beyond business judgment, but no 10b-5 cause of action because no deception); see Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 194, 195-96 (D. Colo. 1972)
(no evidence "directors acted in bad faith or with willful and intentional disregard of the rights
and interests of the stockholders"; lOb-5 complaint dismissed). See also Berman v. Thomson,
312 F. Supp. 1031, 1035 (N.D.III. 1970) (no defense to claim of misrepresentation in merger
proxy statement that directors "exercised good faith and honest businessjudgment"); Entel v.
Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60,70 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (10b-5 includes undisclosed breach of state corporate
fiduciary law).
201 See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
202 Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 319 F. Supp. 795,802 n.12 (D. Del. 1970); Adair

v. Schneider, 293 F. Supp. 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Note, Causation and Liability in Private
Actionsfor Proxy Violations, 80 YALE L.J. 107, 137 (1970).
203 See, e.g., Review 71 v. Alloys Unlimited, Inc., 450 F.2d 482, 485-86 (10th Cir. 1971);
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the speculativeabuse of confidential information by corporate, insiders.
Rule 1Ob-5 has none of the inherent limitations tlath circumscribe the
application of section 16(b). There is neither a six-month 'trading
requirement no r a short statute of limitations. Rule 10b-5 applies to any
person, insider or outsider, as well as to any security, equity, or debt,
whether or not traded on a national securities exchange, in the overthe-counter markets, or privately held. 4 Moreover, a private action
initiated under rule 1Ob-5 may be direct, derivative, or a combination
of both. Literally thousands of cases, many dealing with speculative
abuses of confidential information by corporate insiders, have been
initiated under the rule within the last twenty years. 65 And since the
Securities and Exchange Commission's recent successful suit against certain officers and directors of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Company, section
10(b) and rule lOb-5 may well become the principal bases for all actions grounded upon a theory of insider abuse of confidential corporate
information."0
The vast body of federal corporate common law, based upon section
10(b) and rule lOb-5, has enabled the federal courts to protect the in7
vesting public against insider abuses with flexibility and imagination.
Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or iucirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality (f interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a'
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage 'inany act, practice, or course of' business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any persons, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968). See also PRACTICING LAW INSTrruTE, S.E.C. PROZLEMS'oF CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS AND IN UNDERWRITINGS 140 (C. Israels ed. 1962).
65 Today, it is settled in virtually every circuit that, an, implied private remedy
may be granted for damages resulting from the violation of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5.
Boone v. Baugh, 308 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1962); Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1962); Texas Continental
Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp.,
282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d
447 (9t4 Cir. 1956); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956); Fischman v.
Ra3)theon Mfg: Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir.' 1951).
In addition, dicta in other circuits and acceptance of this theory by federal district
courts indicates approval of the doctrine of implied civil liability pursuant to rule
lOb-5. See, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d
634 (7th Cir. 1963); Nash v. J. Arthur Warner & Co., 137 F. Supp. 615 (D. Mass. 1955).
66SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 1968 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,251 (2d Cir.
Aug. 13, 1968).
67 See Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. Rxv.
1146 (1965); Lowenfels, Rule 10b-5 and the Stockholder's Derivative Action, 18 VAND.
04
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The very policies that were emphasized in the 1934 congressional
committee discussions and reports in connection with the enactment of
section 16(b) are now being implemented under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5. 68 There is no longer any reason for the federal courts to be
harsh and objective in interpreting and applying section 16(b). Everything that this section was designed to accomplish, and much more, is
presently being accomplished under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Indeed, in recent years section 16(b) has become a trap and a snare for the
unsophisticated or the poorly counseled, especially in connection with
corporate mergers, reclassifications, conversions of securities and the
like. 9 The recent subjective trend is a manifestation of dissatisfaction
with this traditional, objective interpretation of section 16(b) and a
warning by the federal appellate courts that this section will no longer
be applied blindly to situations which cannot possibly lend themselves
to the kind of speculation that the statute was designed to prevent.
Concomitant with these developments under federal law has been
a limited, parallel development under state law. In the recent New
York case of Diamond v. Oreamuno,70 the appellate division held that
officers and directors utilizing inside information to reap profits by
trading in the securities of their corporation may be liable under
state law to their corporation for any profits realized. The court reasoned that these officers and directors were converting a corporate asset,
specifically inside information, to their own personal use and profit,
and as agents and fiduciaries they were bound to hold any profits realized from such activities in constructive trust for their principal, the
corporation. The Diamond case is particularly significant because it
illustrates another set of rights, based upon state law, which may be
utilized to remedy an abuse of confidential corporate information by
insiders. And, with the recent growth and development of the doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction, these rights may often be asserted in the federal courts as part of a federal claim, as well as in the state courts as
a purely state claim. 71
With all the rights and remedies available to curb the unfair use
of confidential corporate information by insiders, there is no longer any
L. IREv. 893 (1965); Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for
Rule lOb-5, 54 VA. L. Rlv. 268 (1968).
88 See pp. 59-61 supra.
69 See Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965); Western Auto Supply
Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966);
Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
70 29 App. Div. 2d 285, 287 N.Y.S2d 300 (1st Dep't 1968).
71 See Lowenfels, Pendent Jurisdiction and the Federal Securities Acts, 67 COLUM.
L. REv. 474 (1967).
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reason for the federal courts to follow the harsh principles of Smolowe
and Park & Tilford72 The Draconian impact of these early decisions
belongs to another era. Today the courts can be particularly cognizant
of the policies and purposes underlying section 16(b), and, with the
perspective of recent developments under federal and state law, and
can deal with each individual fact situation on its own particular merits.
CONCLUSION

The logical extension of a number of the arguments set out in the
preceding section would be the advocacy of the repeal of section 16(b).
Thirty years of experience with the federal securities laws has demonstrated the validity of the proposition that no rigid doctrine, no hard
and fast rule, will successfully prevent fraud. If such black letter rubric
is enacted, then clever men will always find ways to evade, to circumvent, to perpetrate their wrongdoings without incurring liability7"
The clear lines of liability drawn by section 16(b), particularly the six
month trading requirement, have prompted the federal courts to look
elsewhere for statutory support in attempting to curb securities fraud.
Moreover, in many ways section 16(b) has become the very antithesis
of what the legislature intended. Instead of a bar to the realization of
profits by corporate insiders from speculative abuses of inside information, it has become a trap for unsophisticated and poorly counseled
businessmen innocently engaged in mergers, reclassifications or conversions of securities. To advocate the outright repeal of section 16(b),
however, is not a very pragmatic approach. Congress has many more
pressing and important problems than the fate of one comparatively
obscure provision of the federal securities laws. Rather, the solution
would seem to lie with the federal courts. The development and extension of the subjective interpretation of section 16(b), the refusal to
apply this "crude rule-of-thumb" to situations which could not possibly lend themselves to the types of abuses that the statute was designed
to prevent-herein lies the most practical solution to what has in reality
become a statutory anachronism.
72 See pp. 46-50 supra.
73 As was stated in State v. Whiteaker:
We do not deem it advisable to lay down any hard and fast rule ....
Were we to do so, a certain class of gentlemen of the "J. Rufus Wallingford"
type---"they toil not neither do they spin"-would lie awake nights endeavoring
to conceive some devious and shadowy way of evading the law. It is more advisable
to deal with each case as it arises.
118 Ore. 656, 661, 247 P. 1077, 1079 (1926).

